Articles, Comments

Is Islam an impetus to violence? - Part 2

by Kyle Garvey

29 April, 2006

[ Part 1 - Part 3 - Part 4 ]
 

Investigating the Koran and Islamic History

The history of Islam is hugely significant, to its followers as well as to the world at large. Like Christianity and Judaism, the beginning of Islam originates in the biblical story of Abraham. The account is also told similarly in the Qur'an. According to Huston Smith's composite of the two versions, Abraham's illegitimate son, Ishmael, fled to the area that would soon become Mecca. The descendants of Ishmael, who became Muslims after God's final prophesy through Muhammad, subsequently filled Arabia (Smith 14). Hundreds of years later, Muhammad experienced the revelations that would be the basis for Islam, convinced his wife to convert, and rose in influence within Mecca. Angered by the growth of the new religion, the polytheists in power at the time forced the prophet and his followers to leave. The Muslims settled in the city of Yathrib, later known as Medina, where Islam became a dominant force; Muhammad rose to power in the city, and even defended it in battle (Cleary 48). After the death of its prophet and supreme commander ten years later, Islam endured the contentious Sunni-Shi'a split in the decision over who would be the next leader. The premature death of Ali, the Shi'a's appointment, after only two years cut short the possibility of Shi'ite dominance, and Sunnis have remained the dominant sect ever since (Kapuściński 82). Muslims further consolidated power and, in less than a hundred years after Muhammad's death, commanded an empire stretching from Europe to western Asia (Donner 251). In addition to sheer size, the empire boasted other achievements. This Muslim territory was known for its early achievements in science, art, and medicine (Smith 24).  Beginning in the thirteenth century however, injuries from military defeats, political mismanagement, and common apathy caused a gradual decline in the Islamic empire (Pipes 5). Nearly seven hundred years of Christian imperialism and colonialism followed, until, in the twentieth century, many Muslim countries regained their independence and political pride. Nationalism, along with ideas about Islam's religious element, fueled a new generation of devoted Muslims. With Islam's political presence all but destroyed, they turned their focus to rethinking theological matters. Movements such as Wahhabism, Salafism, or liberal Islam - with varying degrees of piety and strictness - emerged and captured the attention of many Muslims. It was not until the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, however, that the attentions of most Americans were similarly captured (Zakaria). Prior to the attacks, the U.S. government was content with the containment of violent Muslims like Osama Bin Laden; but after 9/11, the Muslim terrorists of organizations like al-Qaeda would be hunted full-force (Kepel 321). Hopefully, this general history will aid in shedding light on the subject.

The controversy regarding Islam's ties to violence will be organized and explained in the following manner. Both positions, including each one's separate arguments, will be discussed consecutively. The issues of theology, history, and politics will support the position that Islam is an impetus to violence, and the issues of radicalism, political and ethnic causation, and culture will stand as arguments for the other side.

For their first argument, Islam's critics note the abundance of violence in religious writings. The Qur'an, in this case, is often the cornerstone of Islamic religious scholarship. Violence inside the Qur'an deals mostly with warfare against the infidels and apostates of Muhammad's time, though through translation and editing, the book has felt the effects of changing circumstance. A scholar of Islam, Reuven Firestone, has organized all the Qur'anic passages that concern war into four categories: those that forbid all violence, those that restrict violence, those that are ambiguous, and those that encourage violence. The first category contains verses of the Qur'an that command humility toward infidels from faithful Muslims, such as: "Many of the People of the Book wish, through envy, to lead you back to unbelief, now that you have embraced the Faith and the truth has been made plain to them. Forgive them and bear with them until God makes known His will. God has power over all things" (2:109). Firestone notes that the Qur'anic response to this category is "disparate" and "at variance" with much of the later text (Firestone 73). More common are those of Firestone's second category, where violence is restricted, like the following: "Fight for the sake of God those that fight against you, but do not attack them first. God does not love the aggressors" (2:190). However, the existence of such discrepancies between non-violent and violent teachings in the Qur'an may preclude an objective assessment of Islamic morality. Religious critic and author Sam Harris notes that, given the intermingling of much of Islam's unjust history with divine statements, and given the multitude of exceptions regarding aggression, "almost any act of violence against infidels can plausibly be construed as an action in defense of the faith" (112). Since similar thinking could conceivably allow religious writings to justify and, perhaps, condone malice, the passages of restricted violence in Firestone's second category are considered very important. The most critical of all, though, remain the ones that encourage violence, as in Firestone's fourth category. Indeed, the Qur'anic verses that advocate and encourage war often abrogate earlier verses and "have been understood by most traditional Muslim legalists and traditional policymakers to express the most eternal and divine message with regard to war in the path of God" (Firestone 84). One such passage reads, "Slay them wherever you find them. Drive them out of the places from which they drove you. Idolatry is worse than carnage. But do not fight them within the precincts of the Sacred Mosque unless they attack you there. But if they attack you, put them to the sword. Thus shall the nonbelievers be rewarded" (2:191). It is with Qur'anic pronouncements like this that many modern terrorists, including Osama bin Laden, justify themselves (Esposito 32). The abundance of violence within the theological area can support the notion that Islam is an impetus to violence.

Another argument of the position that Islam is an impetus to violence cites a fiery past in the Islamic world. This violent history revolves around both the early era of Islam's birth and the modern era of terrorism. According to Saunders, the prophet Muhammad was, at the beginning of his career, nonconfrontational with the idolaters who had cast him out. But after quietly strengthening his forces, he began organizing razzias, or raids, against the caravans of the Meccan authorities (Saunders 27). Even after achieving some power, violence for Islam continued. From then until about the year 750, Muslims were responsible for conquests of Persia, Northern Africa, South Asia, and the Iberian peninsula (Donner 253). A period of relative peace lasted for centuries afterward. This age of Islamic stability coincided with the height of the Ottoman Empire, when Islam's political arm consolidated power and control (Saunders 79). The 20th century, when the Ottoman Empire was dissolved, marked the dawn of contemporary Islamic violence. Independence granted to Islamic countries after the ebb of colonialism, and the mismanagement and chaos that followed, began a long line of frustration (Kepel 594). Additionally, Israel's birth in 1947 may be the most widespread and intense of these catalysts. Islamic resistance to Israel from Palestinians, ninety percent of whom were displaced by its creation, began with small, guerilla groups and graduated to much larger political undertakings forty years later, with the creation of an organization called Young Muslims (Ganim 124). Outside of Israel, the progression continued even more quickly. In the 1970s, movements of militant Muslims, "a phenomenon whose emergence was as spectacular as it was unforeseen," puzzled many in the rest of the world (Kepel 5). The Arab-Israeli wars of 1973 and 1978, and the theocratic Iranian revolution soon after, further sealed the existence of this new Islamic presence, which, beginning with the first Palestinian intifada of the 1980s, was increasingly violent (Esposito 73). The Iranian revolution, especially, was noticed by politically minded Muslims everywhere. After the success of that country's sweeping change, those faithful to Islam worldwide sought to emulate Ayatollah Khomeini's power grab in their own countries (Pipes 28). A group of these included the soldiers defending Afghanistan against the USSR, whose leader became the Saudi intellectual Osama bin Laden (Kepel 137). Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, his terrorist organization, have, in the few years after masterminding the September 11th attacks, begun a "jihad international" against America and the secular West (Esposito x). Given this history, another argument for Islam's violent nature is evident.

The final argument indicts political outgrowths of the Muslim religion in substantial bloodshed. According to Kepel, many modern adherents, as well as the earlier faithful, hold "a vision of Islam as a political movement" (23). Its beginnings and contemporary incarnations also suggest this view. Muhammad, in commanding the city of Medina and dispatching his followers to capture more territory, began to "assume a position of significant political authority" (Firestone 116). As Islam was politicized in this way, it was also increasingly militarized. Muhammad battled with his men to capture the early strongholds of Medina and Mecca (Armstrong 166). Gradually, this warring infused Islamic dogma as a whole. By the dawn of Islamic influence, "there was little open dissent from the mainstream view about the merits of engaging in military campaigns in the path of God" (Firestone 101). The Sunni-Shi'a split was another political aspect of Islam that had lasting influence. The position of caliph that followed Muhammad fulfilled the governmental positions of judge and commander, not necessarily any critical theological work (Crone 1). This position, now known as imam, engendered violence among many Muslims. Particularly affected were the Shi'a, whose murder and oppression at the hands of powerful Sunnis endures even today (Kapuściński 83). The Iranian revolution stands as an example of Shi'ites overcoming this oppression; however, demonstrations by a different collection of Shi'a in Iraq, whose members were inspired by revolutionaries in Iran, were met with force from the Ba'athists in power (Dawoody 8). In approaching the modern era, political violence is still evident in this area. Islam's resurgence in the 19th century led to a relationship, at the turn of the century, between important leaders in Muslim leadership and the violent totalitarianism of the early fascists and, later, of Nazi Germany (Boroumand 7). After supporting and following other groups, Islam became its own, distinct political body. A 1979 revolution in Iran further sealed this new existence, ousting monarch Shah Pahlevi and installing a theocracy headed by Ayatollah Khomeini (Kepel 106). Following this political change, there have been cases of human rights abuse in Iran, many of which are religiously motivated (Mayer 142). The political arm may also act as a bridge between legitimate governments and terrorism. For instance, the Wahabbi Muslim state of Saudi Arabia has used its political influence to support terrorists such as fellow Saudi and ideological partner bin Laden (Dore 2). Both the religion's past and present political situations support Islam's status as an impetus to violence.

Defenders of Islam to accusations of violence have their own arguments. The first of these maintains that violence in Islam is an uncommon occurrence. If the religion of over a billion people held a direct correlation to violence, many argue, there would have to be significant numbers associated with that violence. On the contrary, Bernard Lewis explains in his essay "The Roots of Muslim Rage," Islamic religious violence is "far from unanimous" (18). This sentiment holds true for all angles of contemporary violence. First, unanimity is impossible on a basic, demographic level, since, as primary research would inarguably indicate, "[m]illions of Muslims continue to live in peace" (Gudel). Second, the necessary notional support for violence within Islam simply does not exist. In a 2005 Pew Global Attitudes survey, Muslim support for Islamic extremism was shown to have "declined dramatically," including a remarkable 27% drop in Moroccans who would support violence against civilians in defense of Islam ("Islamic Extremism"). Third, defenders of Islam against accusations of violence note the disconnect inherent in comparing such a variable as violence with religion. It is maintained that, though reactions to Islam's theological components vary considerably, the same religious teachings motivate the many Muslims who are not violent and the few who are (Boroumand 6). From sheer numbers, the argument progresses to the ideological mood of the Muslim world, where violence "remains an aberration rather than the norm" (Lawrence 6). Considering statistics and logic like the above, another argument for the position that Islam is not an impetus to violence is made.

Islam's supporters also suggest underlying causes, other than religion, for violence by Muslims. According to Lewis' The Crisis of Islam, many of these concern European imperialism in the 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries, along with their lingering effects on modern Islam. The governance and internal responsibility that British and French rulers held in the Middle East in the time of imperialism and colonialism is regularly cited as weakening Muslim states (Fuller 2). Not only was the presence of Christians an effrontery to religious norms, but it was also offensive to the value of a powerful, independent Muslim empire (Lewis 98). Despite successes like infrastructure and social progression brought by European colonial powers, the invading forces upset the stability of the status quo. For instance, "Islam-was denied autonomy under colonial rule" (Lawrence 24). Nearly every political and cultural standard of the Islamic world was forcibly altered by colonizing powers, most notably national boundaries, most of which, according to Crisis, would be markedly different, or not exist at all, under the rule of Muslims (Lewis 18). Beyond a purely pragmatic or religious standpoint, Muslims also see these effects as all-encompassing malice. Islam, in their view, endured "a process of weakening and rollback, mostly at the hands of European powers" (Fuller 33). The effects of these injustices are evident in the modern world. Western imperialism and colonialism have given rise to a pattern of "humiliation and resentment" in Middle East society (Boroumand 16). A second potential reason for Muslim violence is more modern than the era in which these flourished. In Crisis, Lewis introduces this line of reasoning: "Often, this hatred goes beyond the level of hostility to specific interests or actions or policies or even countries-" (60). Rather than wide-ranging, fundamental concerns like those mentioned previously, others trace Islamic violence to single incidents or persons. According to Lewis, the hostage crisis in Iran, for example, was a result of political resentment, not theology. Khomeini, then the leader of a rebellion in Pahlevi's kingdom, was infuriated by improving diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran; he used religious terms to incite the hostage-taking, but his indignation was merely the result of an extraterritorial status granted to the U.S. military in Iran in 1964 (Lewis 129). In a similar vein, many Arabs feel betrayed by the huge wealth Americans send to oil-rich monarchs, wealth that almost never funds jobs or internal improvements in their own countries (Zakaria). Another possible reason for violence in Islam centers on the religion's surroundings, not its core belief system. Lawrence contends that, "If violence pervades Muslim public life throughout this century, it is because violence pervades the world order, old and new" (7). An example of this reasoning might include Bosnia-Herzegovina, where ethnic conflict has involved the Muslim religion, as well as the nationalism of Serbs (Davis 119). The theory of a purely violent Islam is lessened by these ethnic and political considerations.

Finally, those who believe that Islam is not an impetus to violence argue that the controversy is merely a clash of cultures. A branch of this theory, written for general history but applicable to Muslim culture nonetheless, was first popularized in academia with the publication of Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations." Huntington observes the evolution of conflict, from princes to nation-states to ideologies to cultures, as they have affected different civilizations. The current clash between Islam and the West, and the one by which Muslim violence has emerged, are identified as a conflict of culture. As Huntington remarks, "Islam has bloody borders," but only in the sense of fault lines between civilizations (26). America and the West, orthodox Christianity in the north, and African animism and polytheism in the South are all identified as civilizations with which Islam, not as a religion or political identity but as a civilization, battled (Huntington 25). Another argument in this vein is less anthropologically focused and more attuned to contemporary public relations. Bruce Lawrence relates one example in his book, Shattering the Myth, to exemplify this theory of Muslim violence. He identifies three aspects of the Muslim world that may be damaging, individually, to Islam in a societal context: popular Islam, the one observed by anthropologists and historians; academic Islam, for scholars and linguists; and public Islam, one reserved for journalists and politicians (Lawrence 4). Public Islam is the primary outlet, in this view, of stereotypes and assumptions and also the silent underpinning, in recent days, of the predicament of Muslims and violence. Similarly, some believe the conflict is one merely of intolerance and fear, carried over from a tumultuous history. Recent controversy in Denmark over cartoons drawn of Muhammad is one example of this point (Bilefsky 3). Muslims worldwide are protesting the residual stereotypes and debasements of their prophet exemplified only now by the cartoons. A simple declaration of this thinking might begin, "Islam was the great enemy of Christendom" (Watt 229). These experts do not indict the religion itself in causing violence. Islam, according to their arguments, suffers more from culture than from a violent nature.

Many in the international community have made attempts recently to resolve the problem of Islam and violence. Foremost among these is President Bush's Global War on Terrorism. Launched after the September 11^th attacks, the strategy thus far has targeted Afghanistan and Iraq as shelters for radical Islamic terrorists, as well as their various outlets worldwide (Record). Against such unconventional combatants, the conflict exists on many different levels. The U.S., corresponding to different environments or enemies, has utilized both military and police powers in the conflict (Pillar xli). Bush has refused to recognize a theological element to this operation, which has thus far been dominated by action against Muslim terrorists, instead emphasizing Islam's integrity. In speeches, the president often disputes accusations of religious bigotry, with statements like, "Ours is a war not against a religion, not against the Muslim faith" ("Backgrounder"). In addition to rhetoric, Bush is beginning to employ diplomacy in the effort to dissuade religious accusations. Despite a slow start, the administration remains committed to the goal of a more astute war on terrorism (Wright A2). Other efforts at resolution are theological as well as political. According to Khan, moderate or liberal Islam, which stresses freedom, religious tolerance, social justice, and education as well as the synthesis of Islamic principles and modernity, was borne from the ideas of the European Enlightenment and developed intermittently in some early sectors of Islam. Many now believe that moderate Islam could be the strongest aide in the contemporary fight against Muslim violence. As many scholars of modern history note, "It is in the battle for the soul of Islam that America and Liberal Islam share a common strategic goal" (Khan 418). Whether with theology, political change, or public diplomacy, many are steadily seeking an end to the controversy of Islam as an impetus to violence.