As American government officials bicker over when and how to end the conflict in Iraq, struggling U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq are becoming increasingly concerned about the capabilities of Iraq's U.S.-trained police force, following a week of violence in which it was difficult to tell whether the Iraqi police know what their job is. Reports that unidentified militant militias staged kidnappings dressed as Iraqi police, have mingled with reports of police attacks on troops and civilians. It is difficult to know who is doing what. And as well the Coalition might be concerned: Iraq's future depends largely upon the ability of its new police force to keep order when coalition troops pull out. But that involves keeping their noses clean.

But it seems that the problem isn't in lack of technical training. Rather, it may be in lack of commitment on the part of Iraqi police to keeping the peace, and retaining a neutral stance between separatist factions. As recently as October of this year, an entire police brigade was dismantled after repeatedly assisting insurgent death squads in the murdering of civilians and Coalition troops. The remaining members have been returned to the Coalition for "retraining" at a U.S. base. As additional brigades undergo internal investigation for corruption, Coalition forces responsible for the training may need to reaccess what that training includes.

To the western mind, the seemingly elementary foundation of integrity upon which to build the peace seems a given - but to the minds of those who may have little concept as to what a non-corrupt organization is and how it functions, choosing sides and participating in criminal acts may come naturally. Perhaps in assuming that these Iraqi men can - in the matter of a few months - understand how their police force must function in order to be permanently useful in a budding Democratic society, we are asking too much?

Iraqi police and security organizations have existed for years in a sea of corruption under Saddam Hussein. It's safe to assume that most of the young men involved today have only these memories as an example of the role of police in society. In addition to this identity problem the western world is just beginning to understand the extent to which the middle eastern psyche differs from our own. Scholars and former Muslims such as Mark A. Gabriel, Ph.D., Ibn Warraq and Brigitte Gabriel amongst others have explained that concepts absolutely foreign to westerners must be understood and accepted as part of Muslim thought, in order for us to stem the growing danger from Muslim fundamentalists and their militias. These are concepts like for example, that of justifiable deception in the name of religious righteousness, which have been built into the social and religious culture for centuries. In Democratic cultures we rely - as much as possible - on trust, truthfulness and dependability. How to we teach the importance of these ideas to the Iraqi security trainees?

And it is important. It goes to the future of a country and its people. While political correctness demands that we refrain from the merest suggestion that our world view might be the better one, it would seem that there reasons to believe that in this case, we must stand behind the commitment that it is better. So how should we define "better"? If we are to assert that any systems of belief that enable within a society such things as greater individual autonomy and creativity, the flourishing of secular forms of education, equal rights and protection of minority groups, and the life of its citizenry conducted in relative safety, then we must assert that the systems of Western democracies are preferable to at least that which the Iraqi people lived within for decades. If we are to train the young generations of Iraqis that are charged with the future protection of their new society, we must first understand clearly the ideology that we stand behind as responsible for success. Otherwise, how can we truly pass it on? And without it being instilled, can the security of Iraq survive once we are gone?

Painting all Iraqi police with one brush is surely unfair. Since its inception after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, the Iraqi Security Force has struggled to stand up, much less stand on its own. It was formed and trained by the Coalition Provisional Authority, but those forces which are fully trained fall under the authority of the Iraqi government, specifically the Ministry of the Interior. It provides no investigative function as of yet; its members perform strictly security-related duties. The force consists of three branches: The Iraqi Police Service (IPS), which patrols cities, guards the peace, and protects civilians; the National Police (NP), a paramilitary branch that functions as a sort of middle man between the IPS and actual Iraqi Army, to deal with insurgent violence; and supporting forces which function primarily to guard the borders and checkpoints in the county, but also fill in some other areas.

The corruption may involve any or all of the three branches. The Iraqi Security Force has attracted young men eager to earn a decent wage: their scruples need not include defense of the new system. But many have suffered and died under attacks from insurgency groups, even in many cases before their first patrol. The environment of easy and numerous recruits, however, has been one in which insurgents easily infiltrated the system, attended training, and went on to use the knowledge against police targets, bombing stations and patrols, murdering off-duty officers, and stealing weapons and uniforms. So in cases in which militias are dressed as police - authorities cannot easily determine whether the uniforms are stolen, or whether some militia members are also members of the police force. In the case in which dozens of government workers were kidnapped from the Ministry of Higher Education on November 14, the militia was freely allowed to move through police checkpoints without being detained, as well as appearing in recently issued police uniforms to raid the building. A few days later in southern Iraq, British forces responded to an "incident" between what appeared to be Iraqi police and civilians. Several were injured in the gunfire before the troops arrived.

Insurgent militias in police disguise is nothing new in the Iraqi conflict; neither is police who play both sides. But the second needs our full attention now: and it involves opening our minds honestly to the uncomfortable ways in which our cultural ideologies differ. Can these two ways of thinking possibly find a middle ground? They absolutely must find it in the tumultuous, war-ridden heart of Iraq - if the great Western experiment of planting a Democratic seed in the Middle East for the growth of future world peace is to be successful.