Below I outline certain assumptions about the characteristics and relations of humans that can underpin a comprehensive theory of politics capable of successful explanation of the political phenomena.

1. The Theory of the Selfish Gene

This theory, associated usually with Dawkins, considers life as an epiphenomenon of reproduction of genes and the modes of relations between individual organisms, that can be, e.g., altruistic, cooperative, competitive, predatory or parasitic as strategies associated with gene that aim at nothing and exist because these strategies give them the competitive edge and thus survive. Taking genic point of view, as Dawkins urges us to do, obliges us to see any behaviour as good as any, so long as it ensures  the reproduction of the gene that prescribes it, regardless of the pain it causes to other individuals or even the carrier of the gene. From the human point of view, it means that nature is indifferent to morality. I will argue that this worldview, notwithstanding the initial apprehension it causes, is necessary to explain morality.

The reason is that, within this framework of the Selfish Gene, it is compatible to think of morality as good for certain lifestyles that are based on creativity and thus good for the genes that underpin such lifestyles. Human evolution shows a clear sign of achieving greater capacity for creativity.

I use creativity to refer to methods of creating resources through acquiring, transmitting and applying knowledge, exclusive of violent or deceptive methods that aim at disappropriating what others have created. Within this definition, most fields of human activity can be seen as manifestations of creativity. Agriculture, services, industry and trade all evidence the acquisition and application of knowledge, of past generations if not the current ones. However, I accept that someone who is inventing a weapon is also being creative, since he is creating an item that others may need and use. But to use this weapon to destroy or dispossess others indicates a failure on the part of the user to create resources or to resolve conflicts of interest with others creatively.

I assume that the impetus that creativity has is due to the fact that people who can make a living out of creativity can also afford to join alliances.

Considering morality as good for certain lifestyles implies also that there might be some lifestyles which are not compatible with morality and thus stand to lose because of morality. If we grant that it is possible to find a man who lacks creativity skills to meet his needs but who is skilful in preying on others, then, considering that morality prohibits such methods, we should expect that this man to lose if he was punished on the basis of moral rules or compelled to conform to moral rules.

However, this is not a recipe for nihilism. Once we are aware that our behaviors are unconsciously tuned to promote the interests of genes and take into account that we have no obligation towards them, we can allow ourselves some detachment and leeway. In the meantime, we can consider that absolutely every human being owes something to creativity. Creativity is what has produced technology and civilization without which the multitudes of humanity could not have existed. This can underpin the inference that if we owe anything to anyone or to any human quality it is to creativity. But creativity is not possible without adherence to, at least, some basic moral rules which allows creativity to pay off. This consideration can counteract skepticism that morality might be no more than a sham, used as a tool for manipulation. Also, by considering that humans have a built-in attraction for beauty and curiosity for knowledge we can appreciate that many people may decide to adhere to morality not for the sake of morality but in anticipation of what beauty and knowledge that themselves and others can discover, not only in nature but also in humans. I believe that such a drive already exists and it is responsible for giving a great passion to attempts for discovering beauty and knowledge.

2. Knowledge Processing

Human individuals, more than other animals, rely for their survival, which involves competition and cooperation with other individuals, on the acquisition, transmission and application of knowledge (knowledge processing henceforth). The application of knowledge in human life is evident in most what humans utilise and thereby transform their environment. The greater the capacity of an individual or her group for knowledge processing, the greater is their competitive edge.

The decisive role that knowledge usually plays and human deference to knowledge opens the way for competition and also for unfounded and fraudulent claims of knowledge to be made that, if not checked, may generate rewards for the claimants. This constitutes an objective ground that favours the evolution of institutions to validate or arbitrate between competing claims of knowledge. And indeed, humans have evolved institutions to deal with competition through claims of knowledge. As I will suggest later, it is the methods of dealing with the competition through claims of knowledge that have the most decisive role in shaping human institutions and history.

Perhaps, human knowledge can be seen to fall into three main categories. An essential focus for human enquiry and knowledge is resources. It concerns physical properties of the materials and inhabitants of the environment in which human beings live, including the natural properties of human beings themselves, since qualities like fertility, physique or mental capacity can have decisive bearing on the potential for survival.

Human experience and numerous technological applications can be seen as a part of a greater institution for validating, or arbitrating between, different resourcal knowledge propositions. Another part is science. Although science postdates competition through claims of knowledge, and although science may be foreseeing other functions, it can be viewed as the ultimate institution that evolved to perform the systematic validation of or arbitration between different knowledge propositions about the physical attributes of the human environment.

There is also aesthetic knowledge. The reason that aesthetics need be regarded as a branch of knowledge is that it guides our choices - be it in rule-of-thumb fashion - in the course of finding what is useful and avoiding what is useless or harmful. As such, aesthetical feeling can be viewed as manifestation and signals of a hardwired assumptions of knowledge of what are useful or harmful objectively. There is no doubt that our choice of food is decided, at least partially, on the basis of olfactory and visual clues. Evolutionary psychologists have advanced a number of arguments of this sort and, indeed, the argument that the attractive characteristics of a person of the opposite sex are indicative of and favourable for fertility, sounds plausible. Perhaps, one can broaden the speculation further by suggesting that the attractive features of a person may be indicative of social sensitivity and creativity. Art in this context can be seen as the arena where such sensitivity and creativity are displayed. A poem, for instance, may be seen as a display or celebration of verbal capacity and the feeling one has for words and phrases and this is no insignificant capacity for an animal that captures much of its knowledge through language.

However, there is no denying that considering aesthetics as a branch of knowledge involves a broadening of the sense of the term knowledge. The semantics need not be an insurmountable problem. People say a child is learning to walk, and this indicates that there is knowledge involved. Yet, a walking individual is neither conscious of the mechanism of walking nor aware of the brain systems and muscles involved. Similarly, we are not exactly conscious of the criteria upon which we decide what is beautiful or not; we are rather aware of our feelings of approval and disapproval or attraction and repulsion. Natural science, in contrast, is based on objective and quantitative measurements of which we are aware. But this is not to say that aesthetics do not correspond to objective criteria. Although it is true that our feelings are subjective in the sense that we may not be able to describe them and our description may not be verifiable. They are not wayward experiences without any correspondence to anything objective. Though true that we may not be able to convey our feeling of certain colour but, unless there is a visual defect, certain range of light wavelengths corresponds to certain colour, and most people regardless of their culture concur on colour spectrum.

The other category is political knowledge and will be discussed in the latter sections. I call it so because of its implication in the formation of political power. However, certain points need be made open. The thesis of 'knowledge processing' subsumes that human beings are capable of examining the entailments of ideas and that they may demand an account of validity or authority of the knowledge propositions, upon which they may reject or accept an idea. At the basic level lies another assumption, namely, the assumption of 'the mind of others'. But then this is not unique to me; all moral philosophers and perhaps most social scientists make such an assumption, though mostly implicitly.

3. The Theory of Emotional Fitness.

This theory is based on the assumption that the evolutionary pressure in favour of those who can fit within various social systems like family, clan, clubs, businesses or friendships (or more specifically RISs - see below) must have produced a human psychology that is responsive to social value. I conjecture that positive evaluation, inferred either from expressions, treatment by others or self-evaluation in the light of acceptable values constructed by others or perhaps by oneself, results in the arousal of positive emotions such as self-satisfaction, pride and elation which lead to a state of extroversion. Consequently, these emotions contribute to social success and survival in the Darwinian sense. In contrast, negative evaluation leads to shame, guilt or embarrassment that lead to introversion, inaction and perhaps eventually submission, which are the kind of emotions that cause pain and dispose the individual either to reconsider the self and others or conform and accept a subordinate position which might evolutionary be still more beneficial than confrontation.. However, considering the important fact that individuals compete, we should also expect a drive to manipulate and abuse these evaluative-emotional-mechanisms in order to subordinate others and thus further one's own cause. This means that a rival or a person who aspires for dominance may try consciously or unconsciously to induce negative evaluation into the rivals or challengers as an inexpensive means of social or political control. In response, I speculate that there can be a mechanism whereby a person tries to restore the positive evaluation for the self. There can be many ways to achieve this. One may try to conform to social values and attempt to achieve favourable social recognition. One may change the social setting to where one is assessed positively. The new social setting can be for some a circle of sycophants, a new political party or one's own initial social group. For more creative people it may entail rejecting the explicit or implicit values and attempting to develop alternatives. It may consist of resorting to self-delusion and thus isolating oneself, as I believe narcissists do. (Self-delusion may seem counterproductive; however, in a moderate degree it may be advantageous if it helps in maintaining a positive assessment of the self and thus a degree of extroversion long enough to achieve social achievement. Self-delusion may also be useful if it makes a person immune to unjust social judgments or treatments.) Other methods may consist of rejecting the negative assessment and resorting to aggression, or applying various kinds of pressure so that the interlocutor evinces only the positive assessments.

The quest for emotional fitness can highlight the rationality of some moves that would otherwise be deemed irrational from the mere economic point of view and even from the point of view of a simplistic evolutionary assumption, which endeavors to find an adaptive rationale for any action without taking into account the interceding psychological mechanisms. For instance, stunts or involvement in creativity even without obvious economic motives, which seem outright counterproductive, can all be explained in terms of achieving a positive self or social assessment. Likewise, risking one's own safety to visit loved ones in desolate and dangerous places or to rescue other people may also have the same effect since such actions usually draw approval and because the loved persons are usually celebrated and this consolidate the emotional fitness.

The theory of emotional fitness also provides us with the context to broaden the concept of need or interests. For instance, love and affection, owing to the fact that they are expressed in the form of celebrating the beloved, will be seen within this scheme as consolidating factors of emotional fitness; the demand for respect and or equality and the rejection of demeaning values and discourses can be understood as strategies for gaining and maintaining emotional fitness and we can expect that some people would insist on them even at a great cost to themselves. The broadening of the concept of need also allows us to see love, respect and other socially important attitudes as resources for which it is likely that some people may make great sacrifices.

Finally, and importantly in this context, the perspective of the theory of emotional fitness allows making sense of many aspects of life that are concerned with political (moral and ideological) values. One such is the strong emotional valance for the concern with these values - people, for instance, defend, sometimes extremely violently, the values that cast a favourable light on them and reject with equal force the values that question them. Another is the drive that some people may have to change identity, be assimilated or integrated into another social background when the values do not favour them and they have no appropriate intellectual or physical response. A third is the drive to construct and propose a new set of values that give a better position to the actor. As such, this theory highlights the psychological background for concern with political values and it contrasts favourably with Marxism, which attributes the formation of political values to economic interests, without highlighting the significance of values on a personal level. No wonder therefore that Marxism fails to explain, using its own conceptual tools, the reasons that, e.g., two persons in a similar economic and social position may think differently and may even end up fighting on opposite sides.

Emotional fitness theory also tells us that people are concerned with values, though specifically with being valued favourably according to the values that they accept. However, since some of these values may be cruel or ideological we should expect that individuals might participate in or condone committing of horrors. This point has a direct bearing on policy making: to address a social or political conflict we need to address the ideas and values that are held by the parties to the conflict. This approach differs markedly from the approach that sees nothing but economic inequality as the culprit in social and political conflicts and thus advocates economic aid, which achieves little. The failure of economic aid in fact should not come as a surprise if it happens that the receivers believed that the wealth of the donors is just plundered wealth from the countries of the receivers in the first place.

4. The Resource Interdependency Systems, RISs

The fourth assumption that informs this political theory is the concept that I would term 'resource interdependency systems' (RISs). Resource here is used in a broad sense. It refers to sustenance, nurturing, shelter, education, protection, power and even affections, sex and moral support. In this sense the resources include not only exogenous items but also all what can be offered or possessed by humans whether they are physical or psychological as long as they are needed by others. Thanks to the potential for knowledge processing, humans can tab into many natural resources and enjoy them. However, for this potentiality to be actualized needs some social resources that need perhaps be originated necessarily from within social systems, like families, clans, clubs, business, states, gangs, which are what I call RISs. The most basic of RISs that humans need is family. Within this system, the relation is likely to be cemented by the emotion of love which may be a sort of expression of genetically mediated altruism that, as an evolutionist towing Dawkins's line may argue, disposes the bearers to care for other bodies bearing its copies. The practical expression of this altruism is manifested in what parents offer to their child, which sometimes tantamount to all what they can possibly offer. Now if we think of love as a need that for its fulfillment a person may make even the ultimate sacrifice then the object of love or what fulfils it should be considered as the most valuable commodity.

As an individual gains more capacities for knowledge processing, she might be able to form or join more RISs, such as friends, businesses, clubs and  political elites including the one that might run a state. However, it is important to note that not all resources and thus their providers are of equal survival value. If we avoid interjecting morality, from the mere survival perspective, some services and their producers can be dispensable or replaceable - indeed, this is the reason that employees are laid off and some espouses are changed and sometimes some people. Moreover, while people need resources and services they may not need or do not care, necessarily, about the wellbeing of the producers of the resources. Humans can produce food, hunt or build facilities but humans can also be used for labour, sex and as a warring machine, and nowadays even as body parts for each other. This creates a strong incentive, or pressure, on an individual to be on one's guard, to demand moral qualities and commitments from others, and to organize institutions for protection. The autonomy or protection that others enjoy creates both evolutionary and developmental pressure to evolve and develop morality - or otherwise to develop the capacity to construct and deal with moral propositions or even take advantage of them. Now considering that some people, at least, are capable of producing their resources by using creative methods without the need for predation and parasitism, that these people would stand to benefit from building alliances, moreover, considering also the benefits of appealing to morality by an individual who needs moral commitment, we are, therefore, in a position to see the basic factors that lead to the creation of polities.

Moreover, the interest in joining the favourable RISs creates an incentive to develop the capacities for producing resources (or at least to look as though one is capable of producing indispensable resources).

However, considering the emotional aspect of human life we should decline the assumption that what matters are material resources and brute physical and mental strength. This emotional aspect must have been the reason that humans evolved capacities for humour, jocularity, gregariousness, the passion for singing, dancing and the arts, as well as the capacity to respond to emotions like shame, guilt or embarrassment that substitute to punish anti-sociality as well as disposing the subjects towards self-correction or perhaps submission.

Taking the RIS perspective, has many advantages. It tells us that a person may be interested in forming varieties of RISs but not necessarily interested in a society, which, as ill-defined as it is, gives the impression of a harmonious social unit. Yet in reality a society usually subsumes varieties of RISs or subunits that may be locked in deadly interaction. RISs can also be seen as the institutions for which most social selection, a part of natural selection, takes place. For instance, different individuals may make transactions with morally suspect people within the wider society on a one-off or brief basis, but they try to keep these suspects out of their essential RISs and may even back violent actions against them if they are deemed as out of control. RISs are also the institutions for which individuals construct and introduce moral qualities. The concern for the safety of children or business would surely make promulgating moral rules useful. In contrast, it is not unlikely that the same family- or business-person tries actively to undermine the moral standard of a rival RIS. The perspective of RISs, unlike that of society or community, has diagnostic significance. We can expect that, other things being equal, the more RISs whose membership a person enjoys, the happier is that person. This might give a useful guide as to the direction we should work in order to improve the wellbeing of some people. Even observing the nature of relations within RISs can give us a clue to the difficulties a person may experience.

5. Knowledge and Political Power

Obviously, a lifestyle dependent on creativity clashes with a lifestyle dependant on predation and parasitism. At least some people can use both methods. However, apparent or genuine subscription to creativity allows the building of alliances or the forming of RISs. Such subscription, consequently, prepares the ground for the existence of a greater number of people possessing greater opportunities for creative application of knowledge, which result in having greater wealth and capacities and thus a greater impetus in favour of yet greater creativity. Two reasons for the prevalence of creative lifestyles over destructive or parasitic lifestyles can be cited here. Firstly, no one can hold RIS or alliance while professing commitment to a predatory and parasitic way of life. This is not to say that some RISs cannot be formed exclusively for predation and deception. However, I assume that even within such RISs, the predators usually take a moral stance exalting themselves and morally disparaging their potential victims, and they may select their victims among those who are alleged to be worthless or harmful. The other reason, which is a consequence of the first, is simply that people who profess morality can hold RIS. This might explain why human civilisation has survived and also why humans become increasingly characterised by creativity. Seeing morality as a means to promote certain ways of life and thus the genes that inform them, casts new light on the meaning of the expression 'morally good'. Within the context of this evolutionary political theory, it should imply that this good is peculiar to certain people and it is against other people who are more successful in preying on other people rather than producing themselves.

As said earlier many kinds of RISs can exist. Perhaps, a family might be formed because of a sexual relation and because of kin altruism without clear articulation of the moral rules and values that are involved in its running. However, when many RISs, without clear shared genetic interest between them come close to each other and when this proximity makes it possible for some RISs or outcast individuals to gain resources through predation and parasitism, a need arises to articulate the moral values and build specifically political RISs that can arbitrate between different RISs. However, we need to take into account the following: that we cannot be certain of the validity of many claims of knowledge of morality; that simulation of morality introduces further complications and that moral knowledge propositions are capable of mobilising collective forces in favour of certain ways of life against others. These points prepare us to expect competition through moral propositions. Indeed, people compete to put forward their own views of what morality is. Yet, this entails that despite the need for a particularly political RIS, such an organisation may fail to exercise power specifically because of a failure to converge upon one set of moral rules.
 

6. Building Model

My final main assumption is that it is possible to understand the political process and also predict the course of history and even that of the future by building a model of the institutions that can provide and maintain a unified set of moral propositions necessary for building political power. This means that the key to understand politics is to assume that the main important step for building political power is to provide and maintain a unified set of moral rules and that the methods that humans adopted to achieve this initial task have decided on the course of their history and will also shape their future. 

I believe that two different models can be devised. If violence or coercion were not permitted to suppress moral disagreement then the only way out of chaos and disintegration of political power, which would follow as a consequence of voicing moral dissent, would be by arranging polls and by adopting tentatively or experimentally what the majority favours. Adopting majority rule would be necessary because it is hard to sustain any argument in favour of undertaking minority rule. Such an argument will need justification in terms of superiority of, at least, some persons within the minority - this EPT assumes that humans are likely to reject undervaluation as a reaction to protect their emotional fitness, moreover, undervaluation entails exclusion from political decision-making as well as earmarking for subjection to others' political power (for instance, even a benign doubt in rationality of some people is likely to inform placing them under the supervision of others). However, considering also that any majority can err, we should assume that the parties to the arrangement will adopt special measures to ensure that any majority decision can be revoked and a new moral rule enacted. Among the measures that can be envisaged to be necessary are preventing the elimination of the lives of actual and potential dissidents, allowing access to voice opposition and perhaps actively seeking to highlight the counterproductive cases of the application of the current moral rules. These entail, among other things, allowing a certain degree of autonomy to individuals and perhaps forming a social body that monitors the application of moral rules and also aids in highlighting adverse cases. Now reaching this point, we can note the similarities between this model and actual liberal democracy. Two main similarities stand out. The actual liberal democratic institution of rights includes the special measures suggested above and actual election of liberal democracies is a forum in which voting of moral matters is decided. These similarities justify considering a proposition that actual liberal democracies may have evolved exactly for the purpose of dealing with moral disagreement and for providing a unified set of moral rules that allows the maintenance of political power. But there are important differences. The actual liberal democracies are associated with nation states. Many writers from the right and the left argue forcefully that liberal democracy is necessarily associated with capitalism. However, this EPT disputes this assumption, suggesting instead that the association is accidental. Yet, it is clear that actual liberal democracies are associated with centralised forms of government, borders and capital cities. None of these features are predicted in the course of building the model. Thus for the proposition of similarity I just suggested to be taken seriously the differences need to be explained. This explanation is possible if we examine the behaviour and the possible courses of evolution of the second model that we need to devise.

The building of this second model can start from considering how it is possible to provide and maintain a unified set of moral rules without liberal democracy. This is possible if some people are inculcated with the idea that people themselves are not the source of their morality, rather it is decided by some ulterior force. Perhaps, some people would not be persuaded, regardless of whether their scepticism was due to acuity of intelligence or just spite aimed at avoiding ceding power. The conceivable range of methods to deal with this sort of person - and indeed these methods have been and some still are in great use - consist of buying them off, coercing them into silence or eliminating them. Now, owing to the nature of these methods we will need to assume that the model will face difficulties of a different nature. One such is, how can it be possible to make people believe that they are not the authors of their moralities? This is, unfortunately, very easy. Even today, many scholars, let alone lay people, are inclined to believe that morality is something out there waiting to be discovered. This is understandable, considering that humans are only starting to understand themselves, and this thanks to evolutionists - which is nevertheless not yet accepted universally.

Another issue is what to suggest as the source of morality. To answer this question we can turn our attention to actual experiences of humanity to see how this problem is addressed. Religion could be said to be one institution that deals with this matter, and surprisingly easily at that. For theistic religions, it takes no more than stating that there is a divine force that created humanity and this divinity enjoins certain morality. A different approach for denying human authority over moral decisions can be found within Marxism. Marx dismissed the relevance of morality, considering it as a part of ideology. Ideologies are attributed to the process of material production of means of survival that informs the formation of forces of production with definite relation of production. Moreover, within the Marxist tradition it is assumed that humans are by nature peaceful (so there is no need for morality) and it is only the inhumane nature of class societies that corrupts people and implicates them in crimes. As such, Marx did not consider that morality is needed in order to establish a political power.  A third approach to divesting humans of moral authorization is taken by nationalists and racists. In their discourses, it is suggested that morality is the property of biological inheritance of a nation or a race. (It is possible to construct a fictional system of belief that attributes morality to a mystical entity outside direct human power - in the book length manuscript which bears the same title as the article, I have demonstrated that an apparent benign and deceptively reassuring ideology, that is based on some sort of evolutionism, can carry out the gory function that other un-liberal democratic belief systems can carry out.)  

We can predict another kind of difficulty that would face this model by considering the fact that issuing moral propositions or directives and rules is extremely significant considering the power dimension of moral rules. That is why we should ask how it is possible that the majority of people allow few others to decide the moral rules that they will have to adhere to. In other words, how is possible that some people believe in "prophets", "great national leaders" or philosophers who decide for them what they ought or ought not to do? In an intellectual climate, where people are ignorant of the political process, and can believe in superstitions and have no experience of a free press to reveal the merits or demerits of a leader, believing in extraordinary or mystical qualities of some leader would become easy. This is particularly so when people, in certain circumstances feeling disconcerted and desperate, would want to pin their hopes on something or someone rather than on nothing. 

However, if these conditions apply to some people, they do not apply to all and some people may not be carried away. A skeptic or hostile section of a population ready to point out the shortcomings in the arguments and characteristics of leaders of movements may abort the growth of the movement - this, indeed, is my explanation for why fascists and communists did not succeed in reasonably well established liberal democracies. That is why we have to assume that other methods of treatment will be needed. Economic pressures or opportunities may be sufficient for some people to change their stance. For others, a degree of intimidation may do. However, hardcore opponents may persist for whom violence may be the only solution. But bearing in mind that violence is usually associated with predation we should expect a collective reaction against violence. To prevent this we will need to assume that this model of institution should try to morally condemn the potential victim. In other words, within this approach the victim should turn into the culprit.

I would call this model the ideological model. Examining the real politics of the world, one cannot find a liberal democratic system predating a few centuries-apart from the inchoate democratic system of Ancient Greece. On the other hand, humanity has known empires and states that go back in history for at least four or five millennia. So if I am right in my assumptions that, at least, all multi-RIS political systems need an institution to provide and maintain a unified set of moral rules so that political power is generated, and if it is true that there are only two ways to accomplish this task, then all these pre-liberal democratic systems must have been informed by ideologies. This assumption is warranted considering that religions were the dominant systems of belief in the past and that most religions in fact reject the idea of human authorship of moral rules and moreover, most religions condemn or at least condemned their sceptics. I would also call Marxism, anti-liberal nationalism and racism ideologies, on the assumption that they can support political systems without the need for liberal democracies and without considering moral decision-making as a central issue.

Structurally we should predict the availability of certain essential features of in the ideological systems. These systems need to be centralised, because a centralised organisation is better able to deal with opposition particularly when violence is employed. Centralisation comes about naturally within these systems because, in fact, the ideologues of an ideological RIS wield enormous power anyway, given that the whole power of the legislative body is surrendered to them. In essence, to be able to declare who and what characteristics and behaviours are good or bad entails that the ideologue is in a position to direct the political power against thousands of people. This means that the ideologue will be in position to determine the lives and the wellbeing of thousands if not millions of people. Such a person could be expected to be the centre of hatred, envy and a target for conspiracies or sycophancy.

Being in this position we appreciate that such people would benefit from buffering themselves with their relatives who may be less inclined to betray or forsake them. This introduces a system of dominance of a family over the system and paves the way for monarchy. This explains why even in professedly anti-monarchic systems, such as communism, Baathism and early Islam, monarchism came to evolve. 

The effort to concentrate power should be expected to have the potential for favouring the formation of capital cities. Since having officialdom close ensures easier surveillance and communication, this must at least have been the case in the past.

Such a system should not have a system of rights, which is a characteristic of liberal democracy, as rights impede the effective dealing with opponents.

The ideological system would also be characterized by concentration of wealth, mainly through the appropriation of that of dissenters'. This should be an anticipated move, considering that a power exercise would be easier if the subjects are weaker economically, psychologically and even physically and also considering that economic and political powers are exchangeable. As such, within this model we should expect the population to lose its capacity to challenge the system and in the long run even to feed itself. This EPT predicts that such conditions must have been or should be experienced in all un-liberal democratic polities. Indeed, it can be argued that the old Empires of Islam, Romans, Babylonians as well as hundreds of others suffered such fates and that the recent histories and present situations of the USSR, Iraq under Saddam, and currently Cuba and North Korea do not gainsay this prediction.

We should also expect the formation of political borders particularly along the lines where a campaign of subjugation and annihilation against ideological enemies developed into war and this war came to an impasse.

It is possible to imagine an ideological system dominating the population of a society completely, and in this case the continuous downgrading of the economic, moral, and psychological state of the population may lead to slavery and may develop into cannibalism.

Change within an ideological system would not be expected to come from inside, although opposition can happen in the form of a split among members of the elite struggling to gain the upper hand. Thus the political struggle within these systems is characterized by factious fighting which may break up the system into smaller systems. Consequently, within this model we should expect the system to fall as a result of outside pressure. This indeed was the fate of many Islamic empires as well as that of the Romans and many others.

However, competition between rival ideological systems and the struggle for survival through improving economy, weapon technology and gaining more man power may give incentive to the rulers, or put pressure on them, to allow some reforms. In Britain, my expectation is that such a situation allowed the growth of societal forces, who, through Magna Carta, could eventually circumscribes the use of violence and this laid down the groundwork for the evolution of liberal democracy.

Reaching this point, we are able to see the roots of the nation state, capital city, a centralized form of government and also the system of rights and elections. Other features, like capitalism and parliamentarianism which I did not predict in the model, can also be explained. Capitalism can be regarded as an accidental feature of liberal democracy and emerged as a result of the concentration of power including the economic which is necessary for maintaining the political power. Capitalism reflects a moral state of mind, rather than a necessary stage of development of human economic relations. It reflects an indifference towards inequality. This state of mind should come as no surprise considering that humanity has just started coming out of an ideological era when even taking the lives of others by the thousands or millions seemed, and still seems in some ideological countries, a prerogative of the rulers of the ideological group. However, this is not to say that private property ownership made no positive contribution. The mere existence of economic autonomy would give some power to individuals to voice their opinion but unrestrained monopoly of economic means undermines this autonomy for the many.

With regard to parliamentarianism which represents the confinement of moral decision-making to a very small elite group, it could also be said it is reflecting a mentality that sees the current condition of depriving the population from decision- making as a norm and sees the political process as the prerogative of the few. This must be a relic of a past mind set when it was the norm to have a single person dominating political decisions.

Finally, I should say that this model has the capacity to make more detailed predictions about the cultural and spiritual state of populations under ideological systems that do not draw attention currently. These and other detailed arguments are available in the manuscript.